


Psychological Warfare in the C.B.I. and China Theaters

The basic, recognized United Nations theaters in the Far Eastern area were the British commands (India and SEAC) in the Southeast, the Chinese command (Generalissimo Chiang) in the East, and the neutral Russian zone in the North. In each of these areas, Americans (when present) were theoretically absorbed in the command structure of the Allies in whose territory they served. American avoidance of actual operational absorption by the British and the Chinese was in fact the chief preoccupation of American propaganda planners for the area.

The situation was further complicated by dual and triple command. In India and China, all propaganda activities of a non-combat nature were under the United States diplomatic facilities; those having clear military functions were under Army command; and in fact the local OWI representatives evaded responsibility to either State or War Departments whenever they found it expedient, from their own personal points of view, and possible to do so. Formal integration of psychological warfare into the military structure would have left the door open to collaboration with the British or Chinese authority--a contingency which was carefully avoided in the CBI theater.

The Commanding General, CBI Theater, handled psychological warfare organization by verbal commands and informal interviews. He delegated an unspecified amount of authority to his senior political adviser, Mr. John Davies, and also dealt with psychological warfare through his son, who was his G-2 for China, and through the local OWI representative. Since General Stilwell handled most political problems himself, he was able to assign three of his four political advisers to psychological warfare activities in India, Burma, and China. One of these, the Japanese expert, Mr. John Emerson, gave almost his full attention to anti-Japanese propaganda programs.

For a short period in 1944, a C.B.I. Theater psychological warfare officer was appointed, along with a deputy, but the office was abolished when the theater broke up. Structure of the CBI arrangements were as follows:



In the IB theater, following the breakup of CBI, the combat propaganda functions were continued by the existing Burma group, channeling through to General Sultan's headquarters for supply and policy purposes.

In the China Theater, following the arrival of General Wedemeyer, the previous dual command of Political Adviser and G-2 (in the absence of the CG) was removed through the creation of a Theater Psychological Warfare Board,

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-2-

was established under the chairmanship of G-2 and G-3 officers. A Theater Psychological Warfare officer was appointed. He was given to understand that his functions did not normally encompass the framing of policy, and the OWI representative for China (Mr. F.M. Fisher) made it plain that an officer was needed to expedite procurement of supplies from the Army at Kunming. The TFWO sat in on propaganda board decisions only intermittently, and OWI retained its autonomy by referring to Theater or to Embassy in turn.

Chinese-American cooperation was carefully postponed till the end of the war, since the Chinese psychological warfare facilities involved local political considerations to which the United States officials (both military and civilian) did not wish to become a party.

The civilian informational program of the OWI in India and China was successful; it operated under the embassies. The major military function was the preparation of leaflets. By the standards of other theaters, very few leaflets were dropped, but in light of the difficulties and shortages which existed in China, a very creditable job was effected.

Characteristics peculiar to the China theater were: a) dual military-diplomatic control; b) disregard of Washington propaganda directives (which were frequently left without being decoded); c) independence of the local civilian operators; d) informality of the military structure; e) use of leaflets and of a North Burma leaflet and interrogation teams as almost the whole content of the American psychological warfare effort; f) difficulties involved in avoiding undesired inter-Allied "cooperation".

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